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On 20 April 2009, Dr Jayant Patel was committed to stand trial in the Brisbane 
Supreme Court on three counts of manslaughter in relation to the deaths of patients 
under his care during his time as director of surgery at Bundaberg Base Hospital 
from 2003 to 2005. 'Dr Death', as he has become known in Australia's media, faces 
a further I 0 charges including several counts of grievous bodily harm arising from 
his treatment of patients. 
If Dr Patel is convicted of any of the manslaughter charges, he will be the fLrst 
doctor in Australia since Dr William Valentine in 1843 to be found liable for the 
manslaughter of a patient. This, perhaps astonishing fact, must be further considered 
against the extremely small number of doctors who have actually been charged with 
the manslaughter of their patients. This is also despite regular damnting reports in 
the media concerning the number of deaths attributed to sub-standard medical 
treatment. 1 
In 2002, the Medical Error Action Group reported that each year more than 
18,000 people die in Australia from 'avoidable medical adverse events' .2 In January 
2009, it was reported that: 
A four-year study ofNSW hospitals has revealed staJf and senior health bureaucrats 
blame each other tor shocking errors, including deaths of patients. The statewide 
'safety check' found patients were at significant risk of death or injury from falls, 
medication errors, stafting levels, lax infection control and mistakes in diagnosis 
and treatment. 3 
While a number of deaths have and will continue to give rise to damages claims 
for negligence by doctors, other health professionals or hospitals, as well as to 
professional disciplinary action such as suspension, the number of criminal 
prosecutions has been miniscule. This article assesses two interrelated explanations 
for this. These are i) a lack of willingness to prosecute doctors and ii) the significant 
legal difficulties in obtaining a conviction. To assess fully i) is beyond the scope of 
this article, though some explanations are postulated. As for ii), it is argued that there 
are indeed significant legal obstacles to obtaining a conviction and these are a major 
reason for the low prosecution rate. 
The term medical manslaughter is used here to cover all incidents where a victim 
has been killed by apparent gross negligent medical treatment. Such treatment, 
however, is not restricted to treatment only by qualified doctors, and while the article 
focuses on the liability of doctors, cases involving other health care providers are 
considered. lt is also acknowledged that liability for medical manslaughter in 
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offence of negligent manslaughter4 and the Code states and territories that hold that 
manslaughter is proven where there is a negligent breach of a 'duty relating to the 
preservation of human life'. Under the Queensland Criminal Code, for example, s 
303 defmes manslaughter as: 
A person who unlawfully kills another under such circumstances as not to constitute 
murder is guilty ofmanslaughter.5 
In Chapter 27 - Duties relating to the preservation of human life - s 288 states: 
It is the duty of every person who, except in a case of necessity, undertakes to 
administer surgical or medical treatment to any other person, or to do any other 
lawful act which is or may be dangerous to human life or health, to have reasonable 
skill and to use reasonable care i.n doing such act, and the person is held to have 
caused any consequences which result to the life or health of any person by reason 
of any omission to observe or perform that duty6 
Since 1990/ only three doctors (including Dr Patel) and a dentist have been 
charged with the manslaughter of their patients. While Dr Patel's case is ongoing, 
one of the doctors and the dentist were acquitted at trial, with the other doctor's 
charges being dropped. Dr Gerrit Reimers, who was acquitted in 2001, was the first 
doctor in NSW history to be charged with the manslaughter of a patient.8 ln 2007, a 
Queensland doctor, Dr Bruce Ward was charged with the manslaughter of a patient 
in his care and while media coverage does not state this, it is likely that he was the 
first doctor in Queensland history to be so charged. 9 Dr Ward's charges were 
subsequently dropped and as such Dr Patel is the first Queensland doctor to face trial 
for medical manslaughter. As noted, no doctor has been convicted for the 
manslaughter of a patient anywhere in Australia since Dr Valentine in 1843. It is 
very difficult to be cet1ain but there is a strong likelihood that only tlu-ee doctors and 
a dentist have even been charged since Dr Valentine. 10 
Comparative figures from England are still low in tetms of charges and 
convictions, but not as low as in Australia. English figures referred to later indicate a 
greater propensity for English doctors to be charged with medical manslaughter and 
for the courts there to convict compared to Australia. This is of legal significance 
4 New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia and the Australian Capital Territory 
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because the current Australian legal position on medical manslaughter is largely 
based on that in England. This is assessed as pmt of the legal analysis that follows 
but other literature is also considered which indicates other differences, not the least 
being an apparent greater preparedness of England's Crown Prosecution Service to 
Jay such charges. 
Before beginning, however, it is of interest briefly to consider the case of Dr 
Valentine. The accused was charged with manslaughter by medical negligence, the 
trial taking place in the Supreme Court of Van Dieman's Land on 7 January 1842. 
The facts and legal basis for the charge are best summed up in a quote from the 
report outlining the case presented by the Attorney-General who acted as the public 
prosecutor. 
The facts of the case had been detailed before a coroner's inquisition. From them it 
appeared, that on the morning of the 20th November Mr. Swifte felt himself 
indisposed before breakfast, and sent for some medicine to Dr. Valentine, who kept 
a dispensary at Campbell Town. The prisoner intended to have sent a black draught, 
(but instead sent back a bottle containing laudanum 11 ) - and here he wished to 
impress upon the minds of the jury, in the strongest language, that he admitted to the 
fullest extent, that the awful mistake which Dr. Valentine committed was, as a 
moral fact, perfectly accidental, although it was necessary for the law to allege that 
it was done feloniously; and if they were of opinion that the negligence evinced was 
of a culpable nature, that was sufficient to sustain the charge which it had become 
his distressing duty to prosecute. 12 
After hearing the evidence and the testimony of a number of character witnesses 
for the accused, 'the jury did not retire long and brought in a verdict of guilty with a 
strong recommendation to mercy.' The judge 'addressed the prisoner, and said he 
should be SOJTY to aggravate the sufferings he must have endured in consequence of 
the melancholy occuJTence wh_ich placed him there, nor would he do more than 
express his entire concuJTence with the verdict of the jury. Taking into consideration 
their recommendation to mercy as also the palliating circumstances of the case, the 
sentence he should pass would be a fine of twenty-five pounds to the crown'. 13 
I MEDICAL MANSLAUGHTER IN AUSTRALIA 
As noted in the introduction, the approach taken by Australian states and 
territories to medical manslaughter is generally divided between those jurisdictions 
that have adopted the common Jaw offence of negligent manslaughter (for exan1ple 
New South Wales) and those, like Queensland, which statutorily state that a person 
who 'undertakes to administer surgical or medical treannent to any other person, or 
to do any other lawful act which is or may be dangerous to human life or health ... is 
held to have caused any consequences which result to the life or health of any person 
by reason of any omission to observe or perform that duty'. Liability for 
manslaughter follows where the failure to observe or perform the duty is negligent. 
While these different approaches are legally significant, the approach to negligence 
is largely the same. ln Callaghan, 14 the High Court, in dealing with provisions of the 
Western Australian Criminal Code noted that: 
11 Author's addition 
1 ~ R v Valentine [1842) TASSupC 4, 1. 
~> Ibid 5. 
14 Callaghan v R [1952] HCA 55. 
104 The University of Queensland Law Journal 2009 
It would be wrong to suppose that it was intended by the Code to make the degree 
of negligence punishable as manslaughter as low as the standard of fault sufficient 
to give rise to civil liability. The standard set both by s 266 and by s 291A should, in 
our opinion, be regarded as that set by the common law in cases where negligence 
amounts to manslaughter. 15 
The High Court also referred to House of Lords decision in Andrews where Lord 
Aitkin noted that: 
Simple lack of care such as will constitute civil liability is not enough: for purposes 
of the criminal law there are degrees of negligence: and a very high degree of 
negligence is required to be proved before the felony is established. 16 
Callaghan was subsequently applied by the Victorian Supreme Court in Nydam, 
this judgment containing what is now the most definitive judicial statement on the 
requirements of negligent manslaughter. 
In order to establish manslaughter by criminal negligence, it is sufficient if the 
prosecution shows that the act which caused the death was done by the accused 
consciously and voluntarily, without any intention of causing death or grievous 
bodily hann but in circumstances which involved such a great falling short of the 
standard of care which a reasonable man would have exercised and which involved 
such a high risk that death or grievous bodily ha1m would follow that the doing of 
the act merited criminal punish.ment. 17 
As in Callaghan, the colllt in Nydam was also significantly influenced by the 
decision in Andrews, the Victorian Supreme Court further noting Lord Aitkin's 
following of the earlier case of Bateman. 18 The authority of Nydam has been 
subsequently conftrmed by the High Court in Wilson 19 and Lavender20 
While Nydam was a case of a negligent act, its test for negligence also applies to 
negligent omissions. It is this area of negligent manslaughter which is most relevant 
to cases of medical manslaughter. This is based on death arising from a doctor's 
breach of his/her duty of care. A leading New South Wales authority is Taktak. 
While not a case of medical manslaughter, CmTuthers J stated that: 
It was incumbent upon the Crown to prove beyond reasonable doubt: 
(I) That the appellant owed a duty of care in law ... 
15 Ibid [17]. 
16 Andrews v DPP (I 937) AC 576, 583 
17 Nydam v R (1977] VR 430, 445. It is significant to note the legislative adoption of the 
Nydam test for negligence in both the Northern Territory and ACT Criminal Codes. 
Section 43AL of the Northern TerritO!)' Code provides that: A person is negligent in 
relation to a physical element of an offence if the person's conduct involves, (a) such a 
great falling short of the standard of care that a reasonable person would exercise in the 
circumstances; and (b) such a high risk that the physical element exists or will exist, that 
the conduct merits criminal punishment for the offence. This is nearly identical to s21 of 
the ACT Code. 
18 R v Bateman (1925) 19 Cr App R 8. Bateman is also significant as it is one of the 
earliest reported English manslaughter cases involving a medical practitioner. 
19 WilsonvR(1992) 107 ALR257. 
20 R v Lavender (2005) 218 ALR 521. 
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(2) That it was the omission of the appellant to obtain medical treatment which 
was the proximate cause of ... death. 
(3) That such omission by the appellant was conscious and voluntary, without 
any intention of causing death but in circumstances which involved such a great 
falling short of the standard of care which a reasonable man would have 
exercised ru1d which involved such a high risk that death would follow that the 
omission merited criminal punishment?' 
With regard to (3), it is clear that this is an adaptation of Nydam. Carruthers went 
on to note that the main problems with the Crown's case in Taktak related to (2) and 
(3). Leaving aside the issue of causation, which could well be an issue in medical 
manslaughter cases, a significant obstacle to conviction lies in the degree of 
negligence required. In this regard, Carruthers referred to the judgement of Yeldham 
J. While Yeldham considered numerous authorities, including Andrews and 
Bateman, he focussed on the 1874 case of Nicholls. 22 In allowing Taktak's appeal, 
Y eldham ruled: 
I am of the view that any conclusion that the appellant was guilty of manslaughter, 
having regard to the high degree of negligence required, should be set aside as being 
unsafe and unsatisfactory. I mention but few of the authorities. In R v Nicholls Brett 
J (at 76) told the jury that a grown up person who chooses to undertake the charge 
of a human creature who is helpless is bound to execute that charge 'without (at all 
events) wicked negligence ... Mere negligence will not do, there must be wicked 
negligence, that is, negligence so great, that you must be of the opinion that the 
prisoner had a wicked mind, in the sense that she was reckless and careless whether 
the creature died or not' . [n R v Bonnyman23 th.e Lord Chief Justice, ai'ter referring 
toR v Bateman [1925f4 and to Andrews reiterated the need for 'a very high degree 
of negligence' to be proved before the felony of manslaughter is established25 
In Pace and Conduit, 26 two Victorian Government carers were acquitted of 
manslaughter over the death of a disabled man who died after drinking liniment at a 
suburban football match. 
In upholding a 'no case to answer' submission, Lasry J ruled that: 
An appropriate starting point for a consideration of manslaughter by criminal 
negligence is R v Nydam. (emphasis added) 
He then went on to note that: 
It had been earlier determined by the House of Lords, in Andrews v DPP, that to 
establish manslaughter by a negligent act or omission it must be established that the 
negligent act or omission is so gross as to go beyond a mere matter of compensation 
between the wrong-doer and the victim. Andrews was confirmed by R v Adomako, 
meaning that in England proof of the offence of manslaughter requires a death 
resulting from the negligent breach of a duty of care owed by the defendant to the 
deceased and that in the negligent breach of that duty, the victim was exposed by the 
defendant to risk of death in circumstances so reprehensible as to amount to gross 
negligence. 
2 1 R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226, 250. 
22 R v Nicholls ( 1874) 13 Cox CC 75 . 
.,. 
-" (1942) 86 Sol Jo 274; 28 Cr App R 131. 
24 Bateman, see above n 18. 
25 Taktak, above n 2 1, 247. 
26 R v Pace and Conduit (Ruling No 2) [2008] VSC 308. 
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On the basis of the evidence as it stands, as to the allegation of a failure to supervise 
in the period leading up to the consumption by Mr Chuter of the liniment, I am 
unable to identify any evidence the jury could rely upon to conclude that that 
conduct was criminally negligent - i.e. that there was such a significant departure 
from the applicable standard of care that it merits criminal punishment Further, 
whatever might be the case in the application of the civil law of negligence, I agree 
that the manner of supervision is not capable of sustaining the allegation that its 
quality held a high risk of death or really serious injury.Z7 
In Pegios, 28 a dentist, was charged with the gross negligent manslaughter of a 67 
year old male patient. The central issues before the court were i) whether the drugs 
had been negligently administered by the defendant, u) whether the defendant's 
response was negligent and iii) the degree of negligence required. With regard to i) 
and ii), Murrell SC DCJ, sitting without a jury, noted that: 
In order to establish negligence, more is required than medical error or 
m isj udgement. 29 
He then went on to conclude that he was not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt 
that the drugs had been negligently administered. He was satisfied, however, that Dr 
Pegios had been negligent in his response. 
Given the recurring low readings, lack of sustained recovery, and the serious risks 
associated with oxygen deprivation, a reasonable dentist in the accused's situation 
would have terminated the procedure well before 9.45 am. l am satisfied beyond 
reasonable doubt that, in this respect, the accused was negligent.30 
As to the final issue, iii), the degree of negligence required: 
The offence of manslaughter requires gross negligence in circumstances where what is 
at risk is the life of the individual to whom the accused owes a duty of care: R v Misra 
[2004) EWCA Crim 2375, applying R v Adomako [1995) 1 AC 171 . 
As to the degree of negligence needed to establish manslaughter, in R v Bateman 
( 1925) 19 Cr App R 8 at I I, the Lord Chief Justice said: judges have used many 
"tht h 'lbl' ' ""l ' ' ''"kd''l '' lt'Bt ept e s, sue as cu pa e, crumna ., gross, wtc e ., c ear, comp e e. u ,
whatever epithet be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in order to establish 
criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury~ the negligence 
of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and 
showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against 
the State and conduct deserving of punishment. ' (emphasis added/ 1 
Th is legal position has been very recently confirmed by the NSW Court of 
Criminal Appeal in Cittadini.32 
27 Ibid. 
28 R v Pegios [2008) NSWDC 105 
29 Ibid. 
30 Ibid [64). 
31 Ibid [65] and [66]. 
32 R v Cittadini [2008] NSWCCA 256. This was not a case of medical manslaughter. The 
charges arose from the drowning deaths of four crew members of a yacht. 
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Manslaughter by criminal negligence is committed where an accused causes the death 
of a person by an act or omission which so far falls short of the standard of care 
required by a reasonable person, that it goes beyond a matter of civil wrong and 
amounts to a crime: Nydam v R (1977) VR 430 (apparently approved by the High 
Court in The Queen v Lavender [2005] HCA 37; 222 CLR 67 at 87). To prove the 
offence a very high degree of negligence is necessary: Andrews v DDPP (1937) AC 
576; R v Adomako [1 995] 1 AC 171. 
Where it is alleged that the accused is guilty of manslaughter by reason of an om ission, 
the Crown must prove that the accused owed a personal legal duty of care to the victim 
and failed to carry out that duty to such a high degree that it could be viewed as 
'wicked' negligence: R v Taktak (1988) 14 NSWLR 226.33 
II MEDICAL M ANSLAUGHTER IN E NGLAND 
The leading authority is the House of Lords decision in Adomako. This case arose 
from the death of a patient during a routine eye operation. During the operation, the 
victim was connected to a mechanical breathing tube. This tube became disconnected 
and although an alarm sounded, the defendant, the anaesthetist at the time and the 
doctor responsible for this aspect of the operation, failed to notice or remedy the 
disconnection. Two expert witnesses for the prosecution described the defendant's 
standard of care as 'abysmal' and a 'gross dereliction of care' ?4 
Lord Mackay, Lord Chancellor, who gave the judgment of the court, reviewed the 
authorities, notably the cases of Bateman and Andrews, noting in particular the 
decision in Andrews as a previous decision of the House of Lords. As to the elements 
of the offence he stated: 
On this basis in my opinion the ord inary principles of the law of negligence apply to 
ascertain whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the 
victim who has died. If such breach of duty is established the next question is whether 
that breach of duty caused the death of the victim. If so, the jury must go on to 
consider whether that breach of duty should be characterised as gross negligence and 
therefore as a crime. This will depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty 
comm itted by the defendant in all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed 
when it occurred. The jury will have to consider whether the extent to which the 
defendant's conduct departed from the proper standard of care incumbent upon him, 
involving as it must have done a risk of death to the patient, was such that it should be 
j udged criminal3 5 
His Lordship then went on to consider the use of the term reckless by Lord Aitkin 
in Andrews, agreeing with Lord Aitkin that it should be given its ordinary meaning. As 
such, ' it is perfectly open to a trial judge to use the word 'reckless' if it appears 
appropriate in the circumstances of a particular case as indicating the extent to which a 
defendant's conduct must deviate from that of a proper standard of care'. 36 In this 
regard, however, his Lordship accepted that the test was somewhat circular but 'in this 
" 
,, Ibid [4] and [5). 
34 Rv Adomako[1995] 1 AC 171 , 182. 
35 Ibid 187. 
36 Ibid 189. This is significant because of the confusion arising from the notion of the 
concept of objective recklessness for the purposes of negligent manslaughter as 
compared to the subjective notion of conscious risk taking. 
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branch of the law that is not fatal to its being correct as a test of how far conduct must 
depart from accepted standards to be characterized as criminal' .37 
. Adomako was most recently considered in Misra. 38 Here the Court of Appeal 
stated: 
In our judgment the law is clear. The ingredients of the offence have been clearly 
defined, and the principles decided in the House of Lords in Adomako. They 
involve no uncertainty. The hypothetical citizen, seeking to know his position, 
would be advised that, assuming he owed a duty of care to the deceased which he 
had negligently broken, and that death resulted, he would be liable to conviction for 
manslaughter if, on the available evidence, the jury was satisfied that his negligence 
was gross. A doctor would be told that grossly negligent treatment of a patient 
which exposed him or her to the risk of death, and caused it, would constitute 
manslaughter. 39 
In commenting on Misra, Barsby and Omerod criticized the judgment for not 
meeting the criticisms of circularity; as well the test required a jury to determine the 
scope of the criminal law. They did note, however, that the judgment ' provided 
welcome clarification that only the risk of death (not serious injury) will be sufficient 
for gross negligent manslaughter'. 40 This clarification has not yet occurred in 
Australia, Nydam referring to a risk of death or really serious injury.41 
Whatever the legal criticisms of Adomako, the case serves as a focal point for a 
major shift in the prosecution of medical manslaughter in the United Kingdom. ln 
2000, Ferner found that there were two medical manslaughter cases in the period 
from 1970-89 compared to 13 cases (involving 17 doctors) from 1990-9.42 This 
figure, however, does not include incidents where there was an investigation but no 
charges laid. ln this regard, and i.n a more recent study, Quick i.ndentified 40 
incidents that were investigated from 1996-2005. This resulted in 19 convictions for 
manslaughter although six defendants subsequently had their convictions quashed on 
appeal.43 
As such both investigations and charges, while still small in number, can no 
longer be said to be rare. Quick states that it is of some interest that this apparent 
increase coincided with the establishment of the Crown Prosecution Service in 1986. 
This in itself does not explain the increase but Quick suggests a number of 
interrelated factors that assist in understanding why this has occurred. At a general 
level, he notes a decline in community trust of professions, including the medical 
profession. This in turn has led to a significant increase in complaints and 
government enquiries. Much of this has also been played out in the media with 
significant attention being given to the costs of such medical mistakes. Where such 
mistakes result in fatalities, then considerable public pressure for action of one kind 
37 Ibid 187. 
38 R v Misra [2004] EWCA Crim 2375. 
39 Ibid (64). 
4° Clare Barsby and David Omerod, 'Manslaughter: Manslaughter through Gross 
Negligence - Whether Sufficient Certainty as to Ingredients of Offence' (2005) 
Criminal Law Review 234, 238 
41 There is confusion here with cases such as Pace and Pegios, for example, appearing to 
limit the risk to the death of the victim. 
42 RE Ferner, 'Medication errors that have led to manslaughter charges' (2000) British 
Medical Journal I . 
43 Oliver Quick, 'Prosecuting 'Gross' Medical Negligence: Manslaughter, Discretion, and 
the Crown Prosecution Service' (2006) 33(3) Journal of Law and Society 421, 427 
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or another arises. The increase in prosecutions is a response to such pressure and 
Quick notes that 'the very definition of this offence depends on the use of discretion 
by prosecutors' .44 
lll CONCLUSION 
In terms of Quick's explanations for the increase in prosecutions in England, it is 
difficult to identify any differences in these factors between Australia and England. 
As noted in the Introduction, there has been considerable concem in Australia with 
the state of medical services combined with numerous incidents of apparent medical 
negligence. Many of these incidents have also led to patient deaths. What then is the 
explanation for the lack of prosecution of medical manslaughter in Australia? 
As noted from the legal analysis above, the prosecution faces a number of 
difficulties in obtaining a conviction for medical manslaughter. These difficulties 
include: i) proof of causation, where the victim was already sufferi.ng from a serious 
illness; ii) that the mistreatment was negligent in terms of it being a breach of a duty 
of care; and iii) that the degree of negligence was so gross or culpable as to warrant 
criminal conviction and punishment. 
Pegios is perhaps the best and most recent example of these difficulties. As noted 
in Murrell's judgment, Dr Pegios had not been negligent in his administration of 
certain drugs. According to the evidence, the dosage may have been high ' but not 
excessive'. This was despite ' an inappropriate loss of consciousness that was 
associated with a serious risk of injury'. In this regard, Murrell J also placed 
importance on the accused's completion of a University of Sydney Diploma during 
which he had been taught that the dosage levels he administered were acceptable.45 
There was a contrary finding, however, regarding his failure to appropriately 
respond once the victim's oxygen desaturation levels had fallen to 90%. There being 
no argument as to causation, it could therefore be said that causation and breach of 
his duty of care to respond appropriately had been established in the judge's opinion. 
. . 
The prosecution ultimately failed, however, on the basis that there was simply 
insufficient evidence to prove that such negligence was gross and criminal. 
One could not expect that a reasonable general dentist practising sedation would 
have been better informed than the accused. The deficiency was largely a deficiency 
in training and accreditation. The accused's negligent conduct fell well short of that 
which would 'amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving of 
punishment' .46 
ln terms of authority it is significant again to note Murrell's reliance on the 
English decisions in Misra, Adomako and Bateman.47 
While there are legal differences betwee11 the common law approach to negligent 
manslaughter as demonstrated by Taktak and liability for medical manslaughter in 
the Code states and territories, CalLaghan noted that the degree of negligence 
required for breaches of the relevant duty provisions in the Western Australian 
Criminal Code 'be regarded as that set by the common law in cases where 
44 Ibid 429. 
45 Pegios, n 28 above, (45]-(49]. 
46 Ibid. 
47 It is somewhat surprising, however, that there is no reference to the NSW Court of 
Criminal Appeal decision in Taklak. This would appear to be an oversight but is of li ttle 
importance given Taktak 's confirmation in Cittadini. 
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negligence amounts to manslaughter' .48 In this regard, it is especially important to 
note the decision in Nydam regarding the degree of negligence required; that is, 
conduct which involved such a high risk of death or grievous bodily harm that the 
doing of which merited criminal punishment. Decisions such as Nydam have in turn 
adopted the judicial reasoning in the English cases of Nicholls, Bateman, Andrews 
and Adomako. Bateman is of considerable historical significance as one of the ftrSt 
English cases of negligent manslaughter involving a doctor. In allowing Dr 
Bateman's appeal and quashing his conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated 
that: 
(i)n order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of 
the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation 
between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to 
amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving of punishment.49 
Recent Australian case law50 has been quite specific in its confirmation of the 
legal position taken in England, notably that taken by the House of Lords in 
Adomako, and while this judgment continues to receive academic criticism there is 
no questioning its cuiTent legal authority. 51 It is also of interest to note that the 
circumstances involving Dr Adomako are not dissimilar to those of Dr GeiTit 
Reimers. In 200 l Dr Reimers was found not guilty by a New South Wales District 
Court jury of the manslaughter of 74 year old Shirley Byrne. Mrs Byrne died of 
severe brain damage after Dr Re.imers, the anesthetist in her operation, failed to 
notice that she had stopped breathing. This is a controversial case because Dr 
Reimers was later suspended for 10 years by the NSW Medical Tribunal ' for taking 
patients' drugs and failing to properly monitor people under his care, contributing to 
at least one deatb ' .52 ln the Tribunal hearing, Dr Reimers admitted that he may have 
been under the influence of drugs dw·i.ng Mrs Byrne's operation. Evidence of Dr 
Reimers' drug use, however, was not allowed at his trial for manslaughter. 
What then is the explanation for the apparent difference between England and 
Australia in terms of the charging of medical practitioners with the manslaughter of 
their patients? One answer is that the difference is pure chance and that cases similar 
to those in England have simply not arisen in Australia. In addition to this we could 
also note the obvious differences in population size. As noted in the introduction, 
however, the level of growing concern over the number of patient deaths in Australia 
due to sub-standard medical treatment makes this explanation unlikely. If the figures 
of the Medical Error Action Group are to be believed, 18,000 people die in Australia 
annually from 'avoidable medical adverse events' .53 
Despite this figure, only three doctors and a dentist appear to have been charged 
with manslaughter since 1990. ln fact these may be the only four charges laid since 
Dr Valentine in 1843. With the exception of Dr Valentine no doctor has yet been 
convicted. In his article Quick suggests that the explanation for the increase in 
charges in England since 1990 has been a response by the Crown Prosecution 
48 Callaghan, see above n 14. 
49 Bateman, see above n 18, II. 
50 See Pace and Conduit, see above n 26, Pegios, see above n 28 and Citladini, see above 
n 32. 
51 Note Misra, see above n38. 
52 Addict Doctor 's I 0-year Ban (2003) Fairfax Digital <http://www.smh.com.aularticlesl 
2003/ 11/04/ 1067708212677.html> at 23 March 2009. 
53 Bowden, see above n 2. 
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Service to growing public pressure for such action. Certainly the case of Dr Patel, 
including his very expensive extradition from the United States, is an example of an 
Australian (in this case Queensland) justice system's response to such public 
pressure. 
In England, however, this increase in prosecution has been met with considerable 
opposition from the medical profession. While there will be the obvious criticisms of 
professional bias and protecting one's own, Dyer believes charging doctors with 
manslaughter and the subsequent involvement of the criminal process may inhibit a 
full and proper inquiry into such deaths. He does acknowledge, however, that: 
(t)he relatives of those ki lled will often feel that without a criminal sanction grossly 
negligent doctors will have got away with it. 54 
Writing in the same joumal as Dyer, Elias-Jones contends that 'an over-zealous 
crown prosecution service and judiciaty convicting for simple and careless mistakes 
will have serious consequences ... The eventual result wilJ be a deficient health 
service of detriment to future patients' .55 
Properly assessing the views of Australia's state and tenitory prosecution 
agencies as to their views and approaches to charging doctors with negligent 
manslaughter is a major research project and beyond the scope of this article. As 
Quick noted above, however, 'the very definjtion of this offence depends on the use 
of discretion by prosecutors'. 56 Therefore it is certainly debatable whether the 
Ausn·alian prosecution agencies have got the balance right in terms of when and 
when not to charge and proceed to trial. The statistics previously referred to raise 
questions about this. As noted above, there is little reason to believe that there is any 
difference between England and Australia in terms of a declining trust of the medical 
profession. 
While medical manslaughter case numbers in Australia are small, it may be 
relevant to note the number of cases in Queensland and NSW since 1990 which 
involve health care providers generally, including doctors. In Queensland, there has 
been the conviction of two alternative health care providers, 57 the charging but 
subsequent dropping of manslaughter charges against two nurses, 58 the charging but 
again discontinuation of the prosecution of a doctor59 and fmally the committal of Dr 
Patel. NSW has seen the conviction of a naturopath,60 the acquittal of a naturopath61, 
54 Simon Dyer, 'Gross negligence manslaughter: The facts of R v Mulhem' (2004) lO 
Clinical Risk 28. 
55 Alun Elias-Jones, 'Medical manslaughter or systems fai lure?' (2004) I 0 Clinical Risk 
29. 
56 Ibid 429. 
57 See the sentencing appeal in R v Pesnak & Anor (2000] QCA 245 for a more detailed 
outline of the facts. 
58 Christine Kellet, Nurses Plead Not Guilty to Manslaughter (2008) Brisbane Times 
<http://www.brisbanetimes.com.au/news/queensland/nurses-plead-not-guilty-to-
manslaughter/ 2008/04/08!1207420364590.html> at 29 March 2009. 
-59 Parnell, see above n 9. 
60 Naturopath gets five years .for Baby's Deadly Treatment (2004) Fairfax Digital 
<http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2004/02/ 13/ l 076548205730.html> at 29 March 2009. 
6 1 A Sydney Naturopath has been cleared o.fthe manslaughter o.f a patient 'desperate .for a 
cure' .for his chronic kidney condition (2007) Medical Search Australia and New 
Zealand from AAP New Wire 
<http://www .medicalsearch.com.au!News/Sydney _naturopath_ is_ cleared_ of_ kidney_ 
patients_death-28269> at 23 March 2009. 
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the acquittal of a doctor62 and the acquittal of a dentist.63 The extent to which these 
increased numbers in these two states are indicative of any trend is difficult to assess. 
What is evident is that there are significant legal obstacles to conviction for 
medical manslaughter. In this regard, if Dr Valentine was to be charged today, it is 
most unJikely that a conviction would be obtained. While doctors may well be 
negligent in their treatment of patients, the degree of negligence required for a 
manslaughter conviction is high and may not be provable on the facts. Proceeding to 
prosecute doctors in any event would be wrong, with the damage to both the doctor 
and the profession being considerable. 
Finally, while it is foolish and ethically wrong to make any predictions about the 
outcome in the Dr Patel case, certain comparisons can be drawn between the 
prosecution's case against Dr Patel and those cases mentioned above where the 
defendants have either been acquitted at trial64 or the charges have been dropped.65 
Dr Patel's manslaughter charges involve: 
i) the incorrect diagnosis of bleeding and unnecessary removal of part of the 
patient's colon; 
ii) post operative bleeding following an operation which should not have been 
perfom1ed, and; 
iii) a failure to stop bleeding during an operation that Dr Patel was not qualified to 
perform.66 
Whatever the outcome of Dr Patel 's trial, though, it may prove to be of profotmd 
legal significance to an Australian approach to medical manslaughter. 
62 See above n 8. 
63 Pegios, see above n 28. 
64 Note here Dr Reimers and Dr Pegios. 
65 Note Dr Ward. 
66 Patel Committed to Stand Trial (2009) AAP, Sydney Morning Herald 
<http://www.smh.com.au!national/patel-committed-to-stand-trial-20090420-ac58.html> 
at 29 March 2009. 
